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V

CASTES SINCE THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF 1915

IN 1915 American Marines entered Haiti. One of the major reasons for their intervention may have been economic; certainly this explanation or accusation has been frequently made by opponents of American dollar diplomacy. Nevertheless, the ground was well prepared by political incompetency in Haiti in the years preceding 1915, and the reason given to the world by American statesmen to justify the Occupation was essentially a political one: Haiti was in a state of anarchy.

As has been abundantly shown, Haiti never had a semblance of democracy. From its beginning the country was governed either by a despot—the president, who might or might not be benevolent—or by an oligarchy. The failure of Haitian politics from 1843 onward was the inability of the titular ruler and the oligarchy to work in harmony; indeed, the oligarchy was continually divided against itself. Only three of Haiti's presidents from 1843 to 1915 were more than mediocre statesmen.[1] It is merely a question of degree, whether such phrases as "political and economic stagnation" and "social inertia" are more accurately descriptive than words like decay and degeneration.

A brief résumé of politics between 1900 and 1915 will set the stage for a view of the Occupation in relation to the development of caste.

1. With this judgment by a foreigner Haitians may obviously disagree. In the author's opinion the presidents Geffrard (1859–67), Salomon (1879–88), and Hyppolite (1889–96) were relatively distinguished men. To Geffrard may be credited the following: increase of educational facilities; construction of much-needed public works; an attempt to form a true middle class, even by importing Negroes from the United States; reduction of the size of the army by half; healing of a sixty-year breach with the Holy See, so that Haiti might once again have approved priests; the opening of closed ports to commerce; and improvement of agricultural methods. Salomon was an educated man with European experience; his achievements were to create a national bank, establish a sound currency, retire the public debt, lower tariffs, bring in schoolteachers from France, open rural schools, bring Haiti into the International Postal Union. Hyppolite's chief triumphs were in the field of public works—much-needed buildings, bridges, docks, telephone and telegraph lines.

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can "advice and approval," rather than with the legislature subject to popular control. Even under such restrictions the politically minded found ways of exerting pressure on the Marine authorities.

Out of the darkest days of military subjection by a foreign power came a changed order of politics in the country. The practically unbroken line of dull incompetents who had come into the presidency ended; instead of ignorant army leaders, educated men were once more in office; instead of Northern Negroes, élites of Port-au-Prince; instead of benighted martinets bewildered by world affairs, men who, if not great statesmen, at least had minds capable of understanding Haiti's relation to international economics and politics.

The élite were back in power. In the mind of every friend of Haiti arose the question whether the events between 1879 and 1915 had taught them lessons which would make their return to responsibility productive of great things for the country. Because of the abnormal situation resulting from the Occupation, the world depression, and the briefness of their new ascendancy, one cannot yet speak with assurance. Nevertheless, there are few encouraging signs. Political office is still regarded by most candidates in terms of their own advancement rather than service to Haiti. Very little has been done to extend the base of voting by developing local responsibility and education among the masses. Élite youths still receive a classical education, still disdain manual labor, still cherish the ideal of a graceful life of ease. The president still rules as an autocrat supported by the gendarmerie—substitute for the army of former days. One can see no decrease in social distinctions or in the disdain of the élite for peasant people; on the contrary, there has even been an increase of this feeling because the Occupation (through its Agricultural Service particularly) seemed to open paths of development to the peasants. Social antagonism, not social responsibility, still underlies political life.[20]

To every one of these strictures there is a plausible reply. It is no light matter to unsettle the minds of nine tenths of a population by education, to cause an economic revolution by improving agricultural techniques, to admit to political life a people unaccustomed to

20. Dr. Jean Price-Mars, in *La Vocation de l'élite* (Port-au-Prince, 1919), *passim*, especially pp. 51 ff., urges the élite to accept their responsibilities rather than rest upon the debilitating assurance of their innate superiority.

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it. Moreover, the Haitian budget is in the neighborhood of seven million dollars, for which sum not much in the way of great improvement for three million people can be expected. The task of regenerating Haiti calls for self-sacrificing genius—at present the élite hardly qualify either as self-denying servants of the public or as geniuses.

Haitian affairs during the 1930's were under the direction of President Sténio Vincent, an able man to whose credit much can be said. He devoted himself to his task with assiduity, talking face to face with the peasants in Créole, urging them to assist in reforestation and to use wisdom in crop rotation. He settled serious disputes with the neighboring Dominican Republic in amicable fashion. It was he who carried on the delicate and successful negotiations with President Roosevelt to give Haiti control of her own affairs once more. In coffee culture, assistance to trade, financial matters, and other economic details, he often proceeded expertly, particularly in view of the world depression which began as he assumed office. On the other hand, Vincent made the legislature his servant rather than a partner. He was a dictator (fortunately a benevolent one) who changed the constitution by highhanded methods in order to gain his own reëlection. His régime rested upon his alliance with the efficient Garde d'Haïti. There were few signs of democracy or of respect for civil liberties, as Americans understand those terms, in Vincent's eleven years.

The spectator has a feeling that he has seen all this before, when for example Geffrard was elected to assure parliamentary government, only to become an effectively benevolent dictator as soon as the legislature opposed him. Geffrard was on the whole a good president, as Vincent was; but the former did not succeed in setting Haiti upon the path of economic and social security, and one hardly dared expect it of his modern counterpart.

In April, 1941, Élie Lescot, former Haitian Minister to the United States, was elected as the thirtieth president of the republic. Vincent had refused to call a plebiscite to approve an extension of his presidential term for an additional five years, as he had done in 1935 near the end of the six-year term to which he was elected in 1930. Lescot had begun his presidency with many advantages, chiefly the friendly support of his predecessor, his acquaintance with United States officials, and a recent negotiated pact by which American aid will

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not find herself constantly embroiled with European states and American financial interests. The Haitian debt was funded, and a financial adviser remained in the country even after the Occupation came to an end. It is expected that by 1943 the last debt will be paid; the financial adviser, however, withdrew in 1941. Since the Occupation, although the republic has been free to manage her own affairs, she has consulted frequently with the State Department in Washington.

Nineteen years of occupation ended the century of Haitian isolation. The Americans built roads, conducted health campaigns, made their presence felt even in remote hamlets and valleys. American authors, political, romantic, and sensational, discovered the Antillean republic. Steamship companies stopped their cruises for a few hours at Cap-Haïtien to allow tourists to visit the Citadel, and at Port-au-Prince to see the sights of the capital. Every Haitian now realizes that there is a world outside.

Whatever crises have arisen in Haitian affairs, certain problems have persisted. For whom do they constitute a source of worry? Since the government has always been a dictatorship, limited or absolute, subject to no party control, the incumbents of office have never had the experience of being constantly reminded by their opponents of the misery or daily worries of the population. After a hundred years the people have learned that relief is not to be expected from politicians. Occasionally a dramatic revolutionary leader has persuaded some of the people that the officials in power were responsible for their distress, and so worked up a following; yet even when such movements succeeded, the masses never benefited. To most governments of the past century Haiti's problem has been only one: to frustrate insurrection. There is evidence that recent administrations have busied themselves assiduously with the country's internal problems, although none of them has been adequately solved. The élite, at least as a group, do not feel any apparent responsibility for the maladjustments, nor obligation to effect the necessary reforms. A few patriots, and those almost without exception not in office, know what ails the country and say so; a smaller number propose reasonable solutions. The problems remain. Of these the three outstanding are overpopulation with all its accompanying ills, health, and education.